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At the pivotal moment in her “report” on the Eichmann trial, Arendt describes how, on the ninth 
day of the court proceedings in Jerusalem, Eichmann’s guilt was established beyond doubt: he 
admitted not only to his role in transporting many thousands of Jews to their deaths, but testified 
that he had personally seen the destinations to which they were to be sent—the gas chambers and 
mobile gas vans, as well as the blood-soaked trenches filled with the bodies of those shot by the 
Einsatzgruppen—and that he had been “shocked out of his wits” (Arendt [1963] 2006, 90). With the 
delivery of this evidence, it was clear that Eichmann had not only “known what he was doing” but 
had known also that it was wrong: and so, Arendt writes, “one felt [the defense] could rise right 
away, for the criminal proceedings against the accused in this ‘historic trial’ seems complete, the 
case for the prosecution established” (90). 
The moment is pivotal not because it marks the moment in which Eichmann’s fate was sealed (in 
her assessment, the verdict in this “show trial” was a “foregone conclusion” (4, 92) but because it 
introduces the real subject of Arendt’s analysis of the trial: the degradation of moral agency under 
totalitarian conditions. With the completion of this testimony (pre-recorded by the police onto 
audio tape and replayed for the court from a tape-recorder, while “the body that owned the voice” 
stood “strangely disembodied” behind the walls of a glass booth) there remained only one question 
to ask, “the most disturbing of all”, addressed now repeatedly to the defendant by the judges: “Had 
the killing of Jews gone against his conscience?” (90–91). The legalities of the trial could be satisfied 
with the circulation of the defendant’s confession and the presence of a body on which to enact a 
sentence; but this moral question of conscience, which lay at the heart of the political interest of 
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the trial and was expressed now with urgency, could only be answered by the defendant in the 
present. Arendt’s report reveals that what the court found it needed at this point, though not before, 
was a re-integration of Eichmann’s voice and his body, a corporeal re-fleshing that would permit 
him to attest to the inner state that the court sought to discern through his words. But, she relates, 
even so these words proved difficult for the court to grasp in any definitive or conclusive sense: it 
had to ask for them “over and over again” (91) and discovered consequently that, the longer the 
trial continued, “the paler and more ghostlike became the figure in the glass booth, and no finger-
wagging: ‘And there sits the monster responsible for all this,’ could shout him back to life” (8).  
This episode is instructive because it captures, almost in parable form, the extent to which the 
“space of appearance” that Arendt regards as conterminous with her conception of the public 
sphere and of politics, and which she describes as “com[ing] into being wherever men are together 
in manner of speech and action” (Arendt [1958] 1998, 199), also materialises in her work as a space 
of disappearance, experienced in quotidian life as sites of absence. For, in this case, in the District 
Court of Jerusalem, Eichmann’s receding and ghostly figure itself stood only in a middle position 
between those present in the audience and other, even more distant and silent figures, for whom 
his testimony and that of the other witnesses served most unsatisfactorily as proxies: those of his 
victims, or of history itself.  
This paradox of testimony, which confirms that “appearance” in the public sphere must be 
accessed in ordinary experience through attention to that which disappears—to the non-existent, 
to that which is “not given […] and which therefore […] [can] not be known” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 
150)—is expressed again a generation and a half later in the formula offered by German director 
and composer Heiner Goebbels to describe his “theatre of absence”: “Absence as the presence of 
the other, as a confrontation with an unseen image or an unheard word or sound, an encounter 
with forces beyond man’s control, that are out of our reach” (Goebbels 2015, 4, 6). Goebbels himself 
acknowledges his debt to Arendt quite explicitly, quoting her Vita Activa to assert that “you can 
consider every performance to be a ‘public sphere, … in which it is necessary not to attack each 
other’—neither in the work relations nor in the relation to the audience” (Goebbels 2015, 58)—the 
public sphere is, here, once again understood in that aspect presented by Arendt when, following 
Aristotle, she appeals to the human being as ζῶον πολιτικόν, the political animal, whose nature is 
realised through the faculties of acting and speaking in contradistinction to violence.1 My purpose, 
then, is to indicate in the following some of the ways in which Goebbels’s work can be understood 
as an engagement with these Arendtian positions, and to demonstrate some of the ways in which 
reading Goebbels through Arendt can assist in elucidating the antirepresentational political 
aspirations of his practice. In particular, I hope to show how Goebbels’s defense of the political 
value of “spontaneity”, which he associates with the creative capacity of things and people to enact 
the unordained and new, finds its counterpart in Arendt’s concept of natality, and with it traces a 
lineage back, via Kant, to the particular experience of freedom discovered by modernity to subsist 
in aesthetic judgment. To that end, I will begin by sketching an episode which denotes, early in 
Goebbels’s career, his sensitivity to the conditions whereby performance enters into the public 
sphere, before offering a more detailed explanation of Arendt’s treatment of this latter concept. I 
shall then turn to a close examination of one of Goebbels’s later works, Stifters Dinge (2007a). 
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Goebbels’s oeuvre provides numerous iterations of the double problem presented by Arendt in 
her account of the Eichmann trial scene: that of reattaching the speaker to his statements, which, 
once given, float reproducibly free to circulate with lives of their own; and that of the necessity for 
the witness to attest himself in words that predate his entry into the space of appearance. In many 
cases, this is achieved through Goebbels’s extensive use of acousmatic voices—voices separated 
electronically from their source bodies—such as, for example, in the opening sequence of the 2012 
“musictheatre” piece,2 When the Mountain Changed Its Clothing, during which a mantra chanted by 
a group of teenaged girls and young women (“Just listen to me. Everything going to be all right.”) 
simultaneously issues from speakers in recorded male and female voices that break across the 
space (the voices are those of Ulay and Abramović and are excerpted from their 1982 sound work, 
Bioguarde). Of the use of acousmatic voices, Goebbels quotes Helga Finter to explain: 
The recorded voice suggests to the spectator the construction of presence-effects, 
since he perceives the spoken words as being addressed to him. This can be 
attributed to the acousmatic status of such a voice, the source of which remains 
invisible. The spectator will thus connect what he hears with what he sees in order 
then to formulate hypotheses about motivation and causality. (Finter, quoted in 
Goebbels 2015, 6) 
But this process is pursued most diligently in the 2007 “no man show”, Stifters Dinge—Stifter’s 
Things—which not only confronts its audiences with the problem of disappearance through the 
inclusion of many recorded voices of the dead—Malcolm X, Claude Lévi-Strauss and William 
Burroughs, as well as early anthropological recordings of unnamed voices from Papua New 
Guinea, South America and Greece—but which, excepting the fleeting entrance of two technicians 
in the opening minutes, banishes human performers from the stage entirely, replacing them as 
protagonists with “non-anthropomorphic machines and objects” evocative of a dehumanised 
world: “elements of nature” such as fog, water, ice, tree branches; and “elements of the mise-en-
scène” including pipes, lights, screens, projected images and mechanised pianos (Goebbels 2015, 
6). In thus staging human absence, Stifters Dinge extends the Arendtian concern for public 
“appearance” to non-human actors to pose the question of the kind of relationship human beings 
might have with a world they cause to vanish upon their entry into it—a world which must appear 
to them, like the voices of the lost, always in the guise of testimony.  
* 
Goebbels’s career began, as he recalled during a 2014 Melbourne interview with the ABC Radio 
National presenter Michael Cathcart, approximately ten years after the Eichmann trial: 
MC: Let’s go back and talk about your earlier work. So in the 1970s you were co-
founder of a group whose name means something like “So-called radical left-wing 
orchestra”. Is that right? […] Tell us about this group. 
 
HG: I was part of a spontaneous movement in Frankfurt in the early seventies which 
brought up politicians like Joschka Fischer, for example, or Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who 
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founded later the Green Party. But that was in the seventies when we were 
squatting houses. I lived in a squat house for example with Joschka Fischer in those 
days, and we tried to create a music which is as engaged as the movement but 
which also doesn’t denunciate music just as a message-transporting instrument. 
So we tried to make music with a political ambition. We didn’t try to make political 
music, if you know the difference… we would never have called ourself “Left Radical 
Brass Band”, but somebody announced us in a teach-in as “Left Radical Brass 
Band”—this was before we had a title—so we thought, OK, now we are the “So-
called Left Radical Brass Band”. 
(Goebbels 2014) 
Further information emerges in other interviews and writings. In an interview with John Tusa for 
BBC Radio 3 in 2003: 
JT: But was it entirely serious? Or again, did that [name] indicate a certain distancing 
from really high ground radicalism? 
 
HG: Yes, and from any fundamentalist position, either musical or political, yes. 
 
(Goebbels 2003) 
And in 1996, Goebbels related the following episode during a forum chaired by Alan Read at the 
Institute of Contemporary Arts in London: 
I remember very well when this orchestra—more connected to the spontaneous 
political scene before the Green Party was formed—played at a demonstration. 
There was another orchestra coming down the street—from a dogmatic 
communist faction—and they were really walking ‘straight forward’ they had the 
note-stands ‘straight forward’ and they played ‘straight forward’ in a strict four/four 
beat; in contrast we were very chaotic, had more of a ‘free-jazz’ sort of feeling; so 
we started to undermine their sound a little bit as they were passing by; and they 
were so pissed off by our way of playing—not by the meaning of our words—that 
they came and smashed our instruments. (Goebbels 1996, 54) 
In this composite anecdote, one observes the telling of a story by an artist who, at decade-long 
intervals, returns to the same autobiographical ground in order to express the continuity of his 
practice. In this tale, certain concerns are clear: the nature of the relationship between 
performance and political life, the connection between authority and the naming power of 
language, and the contestation of public space through an opposition of bodily ways of moving. 
Understood as an artistic origin story, this anecdote may serve, then, to foreground in any 
examination of Goebbels’s later works, a distinction that expresses itself here in the contrast 
between the two groups: on the one hand, the “chaotic”, “spontaneous” energy of the So-Called 
Left Radical Brass Band and, on the other, the disciplined seriousness of the communist orchestra. 
This distinction, which lies between “political music” and “music with a political ambition”, 
disassociates the political effectiveness of performance from its didactic capacity, its power to act 
as a conduit or instrument through which messages or truths might be conveyed, and instead 
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locates it in its sheer appearance as a thing. For the “music which is as engaged as the movement”, 
or the “music with a political ambition”, adjectivally unsupplemented, manifests its own volition, 
and thus emerges as a political protagonist in its own right. Politics here appears precisely in the 
guise described by Arendt in her lecture “Freedom and Politics” where she observes that the 
presence of freedom in human societies “needed a common public space […] a politically organized 
world, in other words, into which each of the free-men could insert himself” (Arendt 1960, 29). That 
is, politics appears in the unpredictable moment of engagement between bodies, in the moment 
in which the So-Called Left Radical Brass Band, spilling into the street, chooses to confront the 
other, and not as something that, in wishing to deny the living encounter, passes through bodies 
in the execution of a script written elsewhere and in advance.  
Substantially, the distinction drawn here by Goebbels registers also as a contrast between two 
procedures for inclusion: to be a member of the communist orchestra, the listener is told, means 
to conform to the strictness of an ordained rhythm; whereas the more polyphonic inclusion 
elaborated by the So-called Left Radical Brass Band emerges from the “Sponti” scene of 1970s 
Frankfurt and gains its motivation, as Goebbels reflects later in the Tusa interview, from this 
movement’s ambition “not to exclude anything” but to connect with “the other qualities we try to 
develop”—ways of living, cultural possibilities, ways of making political protests—and therefore to 
regard the making of music as an extension of a common spirit (Goebbels 2003). Paul Hockenos 
describes how the “Sponti turn” in Frankfurt involved rejecting the implicit authoritarianism of 
party political association in favour of a decentralized ethic:  
At no time did the Spontis ever have a party platform, party membership cards, 
membership lists, an official central organ, or even an organization name […] 
[B]eing a Sponti meant, first of all, not belonging to a dogmatic political organization. 
(Hockenos 2008, 112) 
If the Spontis viewed traditional political agitation as encouraging individuals to assent pro tempore 
to a hierarchical discipline for the sake of a promised future liberty, they themselves refused this 
deferment, and instead sought impatiently to achieve this promise in the present. To be a Sponti, 
therefore, “meant not to be a Trotskyist, Maoist or communist party member” (Georg Dick, in 
Hockenos 2008, 112), but to turn one’s attention to the structures of human relations and to try to 
find collective modes of interaction which could respect, rather than curtail, the self-determination 
of individuals and their potential development as whole persons. Likewise, Goebbels has 
throughout his career expressed a desire to foster, in the development of his works, collaborative 
and non-stratified relationships among artists and between artists and audiences: such 
relationships of equality, he suggests, are unlikely to be realized within the “centralizing” spaces of 
“institutions, which are not prepared for these given their gravitational forces and hierarchical 
structures” (Goebbels 2015, 58). Goebbels’s artistic practice can thus potentially be traced back to 
this movement, which, in establishing co-ops and squat houses, and conducting teach-ins and 
decision-making assemblies on the bases of participatory self-government and the right of 
everybody to speak, endeavoured to create spaces in which collaborative life might be realized; a 
project that was not so much a withdrawal from the political sphere (as violent street 
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confrontations with police over the squats attested) as a recasting of its boundaries—what Jacques 
Rancière (2001) has termed “litigation”, or the reclamation as “the space of circulating” of “the space 
of circulation” (¶22). 
This points us back to the public sphere and to Arendt, who, despite Rancière’s critique (a critique 
anticipated by others: see Benhabib 1992, 75), does not always envisage the public sphere in terms 
of a particular political model or “way of life that is proper to those who are destined for it” 
(Rancière 2001, ¶3), but argues also that the freedom of the public sphere might be thought in 
terms of the vanishing figure of an “apparition”, a “lost treasure” or a “mirage” that appears only 
when a social order is challenged (Arendt [1961] 2006, 4). It is this reading of Arendt that Goebbels 
aligns himself with when, in his collection of essays Aesthetics of Absence, he claims “I am interested 
in the public sphere” (Goebbels 2015, 13). Against this conception of politics, the brutality of the 
communist orchestra can be seen as the actualisation of violence implicit in the will to maintain a 
certain spatial order: that of forward progress; but also that in which there is a repetition, a 
doubling or tripling of elements rather than their opening out to mutual visibility. The “straight 
forward” sound is doubled by the “straight forward” march, and doubled again by the “straight 
forward” note-stands. It is the potential for disruption of this tight control of the relations between 
things, this “strict” bodily disposition, that enrages the communists—the “way of playing” rather 
than “the meaning of our words”.  
Finally, one can observe in this episode a suspicion, on Goebbels’s part, of naming, that appears 
intrinsically entwined with these other concerns. In the very name of the “So-called Left Radical 
Brass Band” appears an ironic detachment from language, a distrust in its ability to catch the truth 
of things. Goebbels’s description of his band’s music as “spontaneous” or (tellingly) “more […] free” 
in comparison to that of the “dogmatic” communist orchestra, suggests active potentiality, a 
sentiment he elsewhere counterintuitively expresses as a desire for “absence”, an urge to avoid 
“the things we expect, the things we have seen, the things we have heard, the things that are usually 
done on stage” (Goebbels 2015, 5). Instead, Goebbels seeks, quoting Elias Canetti, “To spend the 
rest of one’s life only in completely new places…To burn everything one has begun. To go to 
countries whose languages one can never master” (quoted in Goebbels 2015, 5). This defense of 
spontaneity carries the suggestion that the “forwardness” of the note-stands is the element that 
disposes all of the others, leading them on, so that the rhythm of the music and of the marching 
bodies is subjugated to it and put to its use, becoming an illustration or reinforcement in the 
present of something already written in the past. Elsewhere, Goebbels decries the tyranny of “texts, 
which above all want to make announcements rather than maintain an artistic reality” (Goebbels 
2015, 83); but this hegemony of writing and its order is also shown, in this scene, to end in and 
depend on a pre-linguistic enactment of corporeal force, which seeks to smash all alternative 
rhythms and means of articulation. 
Yet insofar as Goebbels, in inheriting these Arendtian categories, can be biographically situated 
against this precise twentieth-century political moment, it is perhaps also helpful to step back and 
remember that spontaneity has been a political value in modernity at least since the moment that 
Kant, in establishing grounds for the appreciation of beauty in the Critique of Judgment, 
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distinguished between the beautiful and that which we find merely sensorially agreeable, 
connecting the former to the public sphere and grounding it in the representations of the 
imagination: 
For as to the agreeable we allow everyone to be of a mind of his own, no one 
requiring others to agree with his judgment of taste. But in a judgment of taste 
about beauty we always require others to agree. Insofar as judgments about the 
agreeable are merely private, whereas judgments about the beautiful are put 
forward as having general validity (as being public), taste regarding the agreeable 
can be called taste of sense, and taste regarding the beautiful can be called taste 
of reflection […]. (Kant [1790] 1987, §8.214) 
Indeed, it is precisely the quality of “spontaneity” that Kant ascribes, in the Analytic of the Beautiful, 
both to the multiform diversity of material existence as it appears to the subject—the obdurate 
persistence of things in apprehension even “without […] a determinate concept of an object” 
(§22.241)—and to the faculty of the imagination, whose role is to refer the world’s contents to the 
subject’s cognition, and which Kant describes as manifesting a creative capacity “not taken as 
reproductive […] but as productive and spontaneous” (§22.240); another word for this quality is 
“freedom”.  
In Arendt, as I have already hinted, this value surfaces as “natality”, “the freedom to call something 
in to being which did not exist before” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 150) or the capacity to begin something 
new, and it is possible to discern two distinct treatments of this principle in Arendt’s 
characterisations of the public sphere, which appear and run side by side. The first of these casts 
political participation in terms of a retreat or emergence from theatrical illusion. But this 
characterisation is also described as the emergence into a mutual visibility, and gives way for 
Arendt to a second, in which the public sphere is outlined as having a performative dimension.  
An example of the former line in Arendt’s thinking appears in the Preface to Between Past and 
Future, which she opens by quoting the French poet René Char—who, in attempting to distil the 
experience of his generation’s struggle during the German occupation, reflected on the surprising 
discovery made by those who took part in the Resistance, 
that he who ‘joined the Resistance, found himself,’ that he ceased to be ‘in quest of 
[himself] without mastery, in naked unsatisfaction,’ that he no longer suspected 
himself of ‘insincerity,’ of being ‘a carping, suspicious actor of life,’ that he could 
afford ‘to go naked’ […] stripped of all masks—of those which society assigns to its 
members as well as those which the individual fabricates for himself in his 
psychological reactions against society […]. (Arendt [1961] 2006, 4) 
In ceasing to be actors, Arendt writes, the members of the resistance had begun to act, to “become 
‘challengers,’” and to “create that public space between themselves where freedom could appear” 
(4).  
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Here, Arendt appears initially to defer to a long tradition of anti-theatrical thought whose impulse 
is also discernible, for example, in Habermas’s account of the representative public sphere (see 
Habermas 1989 and 1992) and which rests ultimately on a fear of credulity, since the insubstantial 
forms of the theatre are viewed as dangerous not merely because they are false (which in itself 
signifies only a lack of plenitude) but because their charismatic force leads them to be believed. In 
Arendt’s formulation, the fear of credulity inspires the recovery of an extra-theatrical authenticity 
that contests social control: in taking off those masks “which society assigns to its members” the 
members of the Resistance “find” themselves, unconcealed, in a truer, wider environment 
undistorted by fictions of role. The unexpectedness and rarity of this discovery—which Arendt 
describes as an “age-old treasure” of the order of “Unicorns and fairy queens” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 
4–5)—reveals the difficulty of breaking the theatrical spell. But the fear of credulity is also not 
complete in Arendt: in her work, the lost treasure of revolution surfaces periodically throughout 
history as “the innermost story of the modern age” (4) and, moreover, is each time discovered 
afresh by the people themselves. Thus Arendt emphasizes that the members of the resistance had 
“taken the initiative upon themselves” (4) and, in so doing, commenced something new, namely, 
the resurrection of the public sphere as an active principle. 
Is there not something incongruous, though, in this description of a “public realm” as something 
so elusive, both as an iteration of a phenomenon that is hardly perceptible to history and also 
because it appears, in the nature of its revolutionary struggle, as something that must be “hidden 
from the eyes of friend and foe” (3)? For in speaking of something “public” we usually mean that it 
is visible. In what sense, then, does this public sphere maintain its connection to visibility—
characterised, as it is, as the concealed and the unnoticed? 
Only in the public sphere, writes Arendt in The Human Condition, can individuals demonstrate their 
“specifically human quality” of uniqueness (Arendt [1958] 1998, 22), of being able to appear to one 
another as irreducible to the generality of the species-life by virtue of a distinct life story: 
This individual life is distinguished from all other things by the rectilinear course of 
its movement, which, so to speak, cuts through the circular movement of biological 
life. This is mortality: to move along a rectilinear line in a universe where everything, 
if it moves at all, moves in a cyclical order. (Arendt [1958] 1998, 19) 
In Between Past and Future, this rectilinear movement is also the path of thought that runs 
transverse to the colliding vectors of past and future, along the “non-time-space” of which the 
thinker treads deliberately back and forth, and in which gap alone can he (sic) appear as “a ‘he’ […] 
and not a ‘somebody’ […] in the full actuality of his concrete being” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 12–13). In 
the Eichmann account, Arendt similarly identifies this “non-time-space” with the maintenance of 
individual conscience and the refusal of its co-option by “common sense” or the authority of the 
leader. Janelle Reinelt (2015) sums this insight up neatly: the public sphere is the space in which 
the “who” and not the “what” of a human being can appear through her capacity for actions that 
exceed the conditioning forces of natural necessity or the momentum of human affairs. In 
beginning something new, something “which was not given” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 150), human 
beings can aspire to the only immortality of which they are capable, namely, remembrance: which, 
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through History, admits into the company of eternal nature only those mortals who have 
distinguished themselves through their deeds and words.  But because “who-ness” is coeval with 
its own enactment, it must come as “a revelation and often as a surprise, even to the subject 
herself” (Reinelt 2015).  
Those who discard their masks and step into this space are no longer hiding: indeed, everything is 
visible. They are “naked”; all may scrutinize their choices and courage and, therefore, to act in this 
sphere entails an acceptance of responsibility for one’s passage through the world. The opportunity 
for each to act in this “naked” way is, for Arendt, the very essence of democracy. But this is not the 
case passively, but actively; there are always those who desire to banish citizens from the public 
sphere and “to deprive them of the time necessary for participation in common matters” (Arendt 
[1958] 1998, 222). The democracy of the public sphere must be claimed by its members, and 
sustained, rather than understood as an already open space into which one enters with prior 
“rights” established. 
Yet it is in this activity and becoming-visible that the second sense of Arendt’s descriptions of the 
public sphere as “a space of appearances” and “a kind of theater” begins to emerge. For the 
metaphor that Arendt uses for this activity is precisely the virtuosity of the performing artist: 
Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps best illustrated by Machiavelli’s concept 
of virtù, the excellence with which man answers the opportunities the world opens 
up before him in the guise of fortuna. Its meaning is best rendered by “virtuosity,” 
that is, an excellence we attribute to the performing arts (as distinguished from the 
creative arts of making), where the accomplishment lies in the performance itself 
and not in an end product which outlasts the activity that brought it into existence 
and becomes independent of it. (Arendt [1961] 2006, 151) 
Politics, understood as the disclosure of human unicity, implies both an enactment—a claiming—
and context of plurality. For visibility demands to be seen; human beings cannot aspire to 
remembrance without witnesses to their words and deeds. Moreover, without the presence of 
equals to disturb the inexorable movement of the individual will to its execution, the special quality 
of human action remains indiscernible. Arendt distinguishes between the performing and the 
creative arts in the same way that she distinguishes between the nature of human beings and of 
the gods: the demiurge, toiling in solitude to shape the substances of the primal world, anticipates 
no interference with the execution of his designs, which become the living creation; but to religion 
and the poets, he is veiled behind namelessness, or behind many names, which notify his 
subsumption into function (Arendt [1958] 1998, 22, 23 n1). She writes: “Action alone is the exclusive 
prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a god is capable of it” (22–23). Likewise, the creative artist 
herself disappears behind the completeness of her works, which exhibit an ideal of a perfection of 
will, and which announce her mastery of her “doings from beginning to end” (220). But the 
performing artist does not so disappear and is not so subsumed by function; rather, she enacts 
her own special quality unsubordinated to any judgment that respects an end or telos. Arendt 
makes the connection explicit: 
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Performing artists—dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like—need an 
audience to show their virtuosity, just as acting men need the presence of others 
before whom they can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their 
“work”, and both depend upon others for the performance itself. (Arendt [1961] 
2006, 152) 
Hence, to discard one’s masks and to step forward in one’s nakedness is not to leave the theatre. 
On the contrary, one still performs; only the configuration of the spectacle has changed. If, in their 
authenticity, Char and the members of the Resistance momentarily abandoned a stage of one kind, 
they did so only to establish a different “space of appearances” where, regardless, “they could act” 
(my emphasis).  In this sense, Arendt’s casting of politics as “a kind of theater where freedom could 
appear” requires not so much the rejection of theatricality as the reorganising of the theatrical 
event, and a redistribution of the positions it allows, in order to stage a mutual showing of virtuosity 
in which everyone participates—or, at least, everyone free.   
* 
In light of the foregoing, it is worth turning now to Stifters Dinge and to Goebbels’s arguments in 
Aesthetics of Absence and elsewhere for “Theatre as a ‘thing in itself’” (Goebbels 2015, 2), or for 
theatre as “an art form, that like a painting, or like a sculpture, or like an installation […] has its 
secret […] its possible space of imagination for the one who’s looking at it” (Goebbels 2014); and to 
his acknowledgement of Cathcart’s proposition that: 
when we listen to a piece of music we don’t say, ‘Well, now I have a proposition 
about the world that is demonstrated by that particular key change.’ We just 
experience the music in and for itself. (Goebbels 2014) 
For this “secret” of the artwork, which appears in its “thingness” and “itself-ness” rather than its 
power to represent (important topoi in Goebbels’s work and of postdramatic theatre generally) is 
precisely the virtuosity described by Arendt.  
“Thingness”, of course, is also reflected in both the title of Stifters Dinge (Stifter’s Things in English) 
and the non-name of the So-called Left Radical Brass Band. But “thingness” is also an apt word to 
apply to the writings of Adalbert Stifter, the nineteenth-century Austrian realist whose work, like 
that of Arendt and also Gertrude Stein, serves as a touchstone for Goebbels in multiple pieces (not 
least Stifters Dinge). If Stein’s remarkable experiments, as Sianne Ngai (2005) has noted, at times 
tend exhaustingly toward “taxonomic analysis and differentiation” (253), a similar deliberate 
dullness is evident in Stifter, whose lengthy specifications of the forms of the natural and human 
worlds are often so thorough as to overshadow the pretexts for his characters’ entry into them. 
Stifter’s laborious commitment to the enumeration of particularity is clear, for example, in the title 
of his 1853 collection of novellas, Many-coloured Stones (see Sammons 1989), an image suggesting 
at once mundanity and the joy of the collector in the special qualities of objects. Of this author, 
Friedrich Hebbel wrote that “he obviously had Adam and Eve in mind as his readers, because only 
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they could be unfamiliar with the things he describes extensively and in depth” (quoted in Goebbels 
2015, 27). W. H. Auden, too, marveled at Stifter’s “breathtaking risks of appalling banalities […] a 
sort of fugal repetition of descriptive details” (Auden 1945, viii). In the present context, it is worth 
noting that the astonishing pressure of these details, which in Stifter’s writings perpetually 
interrupt the forward momentum of the plot and threaten to escape its bounds, finds a surprisingly 
accurate echo in another context within Arendt’s explanation of the importance to ancient history 
of the isolated moment: 
What is difficult for us to realize is that the great deeds and works of which mortals 
are capable, and which become the topic of historical narrative, are not seen as 
parts of either an encompassing whole or a process; on the contrary, the stress is 
always on single instances and single gestures […]. The subject matter of history is 
these interruptions—the extraordinary, in other words. (Arendt [1961] 2006, 42) 
And indeed Arendt, in her own unpublished review of Stifter’s novella Rock Crystal, names Stifter 
as “the greatest landscape-painter in literature”, calling attention to his “extraordinary precision” 
and his “distrust of generalities, of the very quality of an abstract word”— 
and this to such a degree that, for him, the word horse is already too much of an 
abstraction. He will never write of a rider on a horse but rather of a certain well-
described man on a dapple-gray. (Arendt 2007, 111) 
Goebbels himself incorporates a number of excerpts from Stifter into Stifters Dinge, which may also 
be described as a “landscape piece” in that, physically, it presents a varied stage topography filled 
with a rich flora of objects over whose features the audience’s attention ranges, and because the 
marginalization of human figures permits a scenic tempo to displace “drama” in the progression 
of the work. Most prominently, Goebbels includes excerpts from the “Ice Tale”—a fragmentary 
piece that describes the abandonment of a journey through a forest due to the onset of immense 
cold (Stifter [1846] 1997). The tale appears in two separate moments: in the first, a recorded voice 
“reads” the text aloud while, on stage, the audience watches the colours of a projected image slowly 
change; in the second, the text of the “Ice Tale” itself becomes a collection of “things” as its words 
and letters are projected across the uneven surfaces of the stage space, evoking, in their broken 
whiteness, the snow and ice of the storm.3 This is obviously an encounter with sublimity, and 
Johannes Birringer (2013) confirms this in his review of Stifters Dinge when he writes: “Stifter’s 
narrative voice evokes the Kantian sublime, the amazement and terror that might grip us when 
facing the imponderable and abysmal, threatening us to lose ourselves ‘into that thing...’” (6). Yet 
the complex mood of Stifter’s text can be caught also in those places where, counter-intuitively, 
there appears the presence of something else. For as well as awe and terror, there appear smaller, 
happier emotions—a countervailing domesticity and interest in the particular object: 
To keep the fir tree beside my small summer bench from being damaged, someone 
had knocked down the ice from it with long poles as far as he could reach, and 
when the top of the tree seemed about to tilt, my other servant, Kajetan, had 
climbed up to it, carefully knocked down the ice, and then tied around the highest 
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branches two barn ropes which he let down and shook from time to time. They 
knew this tree was dear to me and also very beautiful, with green branches so 
thickly bunched together that an enormous weight of ice had been clinging to it 
which might easily split the tree or at least break its boughs. (Stifter 1997, 54) 
The tension conjured in this image, between the beauty that inheres in the closeness of the “green 
branches so thickly bunched together” and the “enormous weight […] which might easily split” 
stems from the expression of a personal preference, which has at its origin a first turning of 
attention, a direction of the gaze towards a depth which is not open and ultimately enveloping of 
the subject, but finitely circumscribed, receding within the interior of a defined shape. And in 
writing about the scenes in which these texts appear in his works, Goebbels as often invokes 
feelings of pleasure—of “animation”, “relief”, “delight” or of being “untroubled” (Goebbels 2015, 5–
6; Goebbels 2011)—as he does of dread, fear, or the strangeness of alterity.  
Writing about the origins of Stifters Dinge, Goebbels observes that “[t]he starting point of these 
experiments was initially to attempt an absence of performers onstage” (Goebbels 2015, 28). 
Elsewhere, he writes of the “narcissistic” disposition of theatrical spectators who look to find 
themselves reflected in the human figures of actors or other performers, or even in constructed 
anthropomorphic objects that, because they “move in a human-like manner” are able to serve as 
“projection surface[s] for our […] desire” (6, 31, 32). Instead, Goebbels states that Stifters Dinge arose 
“from an experimental desire to develop something on stage which we cannot use as a mirror […] 
to assemble things on stage which remain strange to us” (32): 
Hence, Stifters Dinge became a ‘no-man show’, in which curtains, lights, music and 
space—all the elements that usually prepare, support, illustrate and serve a 
theatrical performance and its performers, become (in a kind of justice long 
deferred) the protagonists, together with five pianos, metal plates, stones, water, 
fog, rain and ice. (Goebbels 2015, 5) 
Instead of a human performer, in the middle of the theatrical space in Stifters Dinge is a rectangular 
pool, divided into three sections roughly the size and dimensions of cinema screens, around which 
the forest of all of the other “protagonists”—the tree branches, pianos, pipes and plates—are 
arranged. But this reflective surface does not, like Narcissus’s pond, throw back the image of the 
viewer who bends towards it, but rather is angled obliquely away from the audience and, over the 
course of the performance, casts up its own secrets, in shapes that insinuate the indifference of a 
de-anthropomorphised world: blocks of light that pass over it, almost but not quite like clouds; the 
illuminated puckering of “raindrops” hitting its surface, which, side-lit in the darkness, look quite 
like the reflected twinkling of stars; fog that bubbles up from dry ice pellets in popping spurts and 
seems to thicken the water, nearly resembling a liquid marsh belching gas from its depths. These 
impressions, in their “nearly-ness” and “quite-ness”, seem to point to the strategy in Goebbels’s 
work that Corey Wakeling (2017) (following Todorov) 4  has identified as “signification but not 
representation”: the recollection of absent things by present things, which evoke them without 
being reducible to them. In Aesthetics of Absence, as already noted, Goebbels writes of “a 
confrontation with an unseen image or an unheard word or sound” (Goebbels 2015, 6) and also 
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the possibility for the spectator of “an artistic experience [that] does not have to result exclusively 
from a direct encounter, but can also be thought of as a triangular, indirect, non-immediate 
relationship with a mediatized third-party” (Goebbels 2015, 85). In this aqueous central void (which 
is not one), then, one discovers encapsulated the sink into which representation falls—the fluid 
inexactitude of being vis-à-vis what is supposedly missing. The pool does not reproduce the world 
as it might appear in the absence of human beings (which action would involve the illogicality of 
regarding the spectator’s gaze as the absence of a gaze), but introduces things (squares of light, 
droplets, bubbles) that, because they cannot be anything other than what they are, are able to 
stand as symbols, not of what is missing, but of the thought of absence itself.  
This scenic arrangement of water amidst a forest of things is subsequently doubled with the 
appearance (via projection onto a gauze curtain) of Jacob Isaackszoon van Ruisdael’s Swamp.5 Like 
the other painting appearing significantly in Stifters Dinge, Paolo Uccello’s Night Hunt, 6  Swamp 
similarly features trees which perspectivally encircle an emptiness (in this case a marsh); just 
discernible near—but not quite at—the vanishing point of this painting is a tiny human figure. With 
this doubling, the noises that pervade Stifters Dinge—humming wires, a scraping stone, the sharp 
snap of a light shutter closing, the deep blat of a flap hitting a pipe-end, trickling water, discordant 
piano phrases—suddenly resonate as the unheard sounds of deep nature—of nature by itself. 
Even the recognisably human music of a Bach piece (the Chromatic Fantasia and Fugue), playing on 
one of the five automated pianos, registers a sense of loss as the keys visibly move up and down 
by themselves, revealing the invisibility of the player, her disappearance from the present. It is 
clear that this painting synechdochically reciprocates, on the level of the image, Stifters Dinge itself. 
Swamp is more overtly evocative of sublimity than Night Hunt—an overwhelming and foreboding 
vastness of space within which a single individual vanishes into the grotesqueries of the 
landscape—and yet in writing about the compositional method of Stifters Dinge, Goebbels uses 
vocabulary that refers more clearly to the “inspiring principle […] fully manifest only in the 
performing act” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 151) than to the paralysis of terror: 
When there isn’t anyone on stage any longer […], when nothing is being shown, 
then the spectators must discover things themselves. The audience’s delight in 
making these discoveries is enabled only by the absence of the performers, who 
usually artfully fulfil the task of demonstrating and focus the audience’s attention 
on themselves. Only their absence creates the gap, which renders this freedom and 
pleasure possible. (Goebbels 2015, 5–6) 
“Freedom”, and “pleasure” in discovery are exactly the terms used by Arendt to describe the 
subject’s experience of action: a pleasure only possible in this case in the roving motion of 
perception over objects where, in Kantian terms, “no determinate concept restricts them to a 
particular rule” (Kant [1790] 1987, §9.217). This rule is that which determines the exact placement 
of the “pure line of the horizon” (indistinguishable in the image) towards which, as The State 
Hermitage Museum’s website (2019) informs viewers, the lost traveller in Swamp “seems to be 
trudging in search of firm ground”. 
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What is missing in Goebbels’s “adaptation” of Swamp—and what connects his adaptation back to 
the “freedom” and “pleasure” of action—is the human figure near the centre of the image. 
Moreover, a similar absence is apparent in the decelerated motion through which Goebbels slowly 
reveals to the audience small glimpses of Paolo Uccello’s Night Hunt. This painting, which bends all 
of its figures toward the vanishing point of a great chase, is projected in a late scene by Goebbels 
across the otherwise darkened space of the theatre, catching the surfaces of some of the objects 
it contains: tree branches, mechanized pianos, water, light-stands, speakers. Here and there a 
fragment of Uccello’s image is reflected indistinctly back, but for the most part the work remains 
invisible until a small screen, suspended from two wires and a pulley system, descends and begins 
a crawling circuit of the visual field. As this opaque screen travels around the projected image and 
catches the projected light, some of the Night Hunt’s features become visible: first, animals 
running—apparently directionlessly—deer and dogs moving along jumbled and seemingly 
purposeless vectors; then other bodies, which quickly disintegrate into a series of impressions—a 
head, a tail, a torso, legs, a tree stump, flowers, a hand clutching the shaft of a spear, the eye of a 
horse.  
Notable in this movement is the fact that the screen, and thus the implied gaze, circles around but 
never arrives at the vanishing point of Uccello’s perspectival composition, the goal of the chase—
and yet, when one examines the original, it is not clear what this goal is. Is it a deer? For in the 
centre of Uccello’s picture the animals recede amongst the trees until it is uncertain whether the 
furthest figures are deer or dogs; following this line back to the foreground, one finds both species 
mingled together and now also intermixed with both men and horses, so that again it is not clear 
who is chasing whom. There is no final figure that leads and thus gives order to the hunt. Deer, 
dogs, horses and men all appear before and after one another, yet all equally streaming toward a 
quarry that remains undefined; it is not hard to imagine this line extending forever, a continuous 
locomotion of bodies in pursuit of a purpose, which would allow them finally to cease all of this 
exertion and rest in an authoritative determination of their connection to one another—a purpose 
towards which each body moves but always just falls short of achieving. Figured in the spectacle 
of this painting’s great hunt, then, is the restless motion of being’s inequivalence to its concept: a 
motion arrested by Goebbels, who, in unmooring the image from the referential anchor of its visual 
focal point, allows the flotsam of its details to float free. Untethered from the gestalt of the whole, 
things lose their relation to one another: deer and dogs; but also body parts, which become 
animated in their independence, yet also inscrutably desiring—so that the fist holding the spear 
seems to do so for no other reason than to grasp it eternally. The spear, too, shorn of utility, ceases 
to be a spear; the trees of the forest loose themselves from the regimentation of their 
mathematical espacement and emerge promiscuously from the background, no longer holding to 
their function as a perspectival grid against which the movement of agents can be measured, but 
asserting themselves as things in themselves which, as the screen moves across them, gather our 
attention just as much as those other objects that we now attend to: an ear, a blade of grass, a 
face—or even the lines and colours of the brushwork itself, which, too, shake themselves free of 
the shapes that they make up, to appear in the unique complexity of their textures, liberated from 
the demand to represent something other than themselves. They cease to be “actors”, and become 
visible. 
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This excision of the centre which bends everything else towards it (observed here on the level of 
the image) becomes a principle of much of Goebbels’s work: the diffusion of attention over the 
entirety of the sensory field, rather than its capture by a single organising element. Goebbels says: 
“Literally, an empty centre stage [means] the absence of a visually centralised focus, but also as 
the absence of what we call a clear theme, topic, of a play, or a message” (Goebbels 2011; cf. 
Goebbels 2015, 5). Thus, in the “staged concert” Eislermaterial,7 Goebbels arranges the orchestra 
around three edges of the stage, leaving the centre vacant and asking the musicians to play without 
the guidance of a conductor (the conductor’s position is occupied by a small statue of Eisler, as if 
to emphasise his absence; see Goebbels 2015, 3); a similar moment occurs in When the Mountain 
Changed Its Clothing when the Carmina Slovenica choir, in order to sing the Las Huelgas Codex’s 
“Benedicamus Domino”, likewise positions itself along three sides of the performance space, 
behind a ring of white tables, leaving the interior unoccupied. And the empty centre is, of course, 
the generative premise of this “no-man show” or “performative installation without performer” that 
is Stifters Dinge (Goebbels 2015, 5, 27).  
What one witnesses, then, in both this scene involving Night Hunt and the earlier one involving 
Swamp, is a double dissolution: the disappearance of a disappearance that therefore also marks a 
re-emergence to view. On the level of content, the denial of the vanishing point causes the image 
to break down into its minutest details. The hunt ceases, bodies and textures shake themselves 
loose, the infinite line expands to a volume. But as each image flattens out, it also becomes 
impossible to ignore that aspect of the representation that reaches out into space to become a 
thing amongst the landscape of branches, stones, water, and ice. Or rather, two things, which now 
also separate from one another: for the projected image is also a “screen”, which catches the “light”. 
Notably, in their intersection, each renders the other visible: the small screen, stumbling brightly 
around the features of Uccello’s composition, reveals the hidden presence of the projection of the 
work, reflecting its light partially back to the viewer; reciprocally, the flux of the projection 
illuminates the screen itself and reveals it to be a surface inequivalent to the forms that pass across 
it. Light, here, is disclosed in its double nature: just as the details of the image separate from one 
another, so one observes—in the transience of those impressions from Night Hunt that, appearing, 
soon slide back into darkness as the screen moves on—light separated from the information it 
carries. Light in its mediality: as that which enables objects to be seen, but is in itself invisible. Or 
rather (like all mediality), as that which is the only thing that can be seen: to use Hans-Thies 
Lehmann’s phrase, as “the phenomenality of visibility that is blinding” (Lehmann 2006, 164). 
Additionally, though, in the roving motion of the screen around the theatrical space, is it not 
possible to see reflected the wandering motion of the eye itself: a gaze that, as if it were tracing 
the lines of thickly clustered branches from the comfort of a summer bench, winds anfractuously 
inward from the limit of a circumference? Goebbels describes how, with the separation of 
elements, the audience is granted a “freedom of perception” (Goebbels 2015, 11) that enables “the 
onlooker’s eyes [to] wander from left to right, from background to the front, from this scene to the 
next” (11). Thematised here, then, is aesthetic judgment itself, or the restlessness of conscience, 
the power of natality. For just as things reappear “in themselves” in this dissolution of content, this 
appearance is described by Goebbels in terms of pleasure and a reprieve from authority: “Audience 
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members,” he writes, “often let me know afterwards with some relief: ‘Finally, nobody on stage to 
tell me what to think’” (6).  
Stifters Dinge thus at last returns us to the paradox of testimony offered by Arendt in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, which demands that under conditions of modernity judgment must be dissevered from 
authority for justice to be served. In the postscript to her report, Arendt locates Eichmann’s moral 
failing in his “lack of imagination”, which led him to act “fully within the framework of the kind of 
judgment required of him […] he did not have to fall back upon his ‘conscience’” (Arendt [1963] 
2006, 287, 293). The logical culmination of this bureaucratic mindset is “the rule of Nobody” under 
which subjects devolve into “functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery” (Arendt 
[1963] 2006, 289); a retreat from individual distinctness that in the twentieth century converges 
with unprecedented crimes whose target is the plurality of the human world, “an attack upon 
human diversity as such” (Arendt [1963] 2006, 268–9). In our own time, faced with other, similarly 
vast disappearances of the natural world and of culture, Goebbels’s work meditates upon the 
likelihood that any attempts at justice will have to navigate related problems of representation. 
How is the case to be made for the vanished and vanishing; by whom and to whom? Arendt’s 
diagnosis of the Eichmann trial’s shortcomings was that the District Court of Jerusalem was 
ultimately unable to grasp such facts, including that Eichmann was a “Nobody”: and hence, in failing 
to see nobody, compelled him clumsily to visibility.  
Compared with this tenuous focal presence, the “empty centre” of Goebbels’s compositions points 
to a different type of absence. This “other” absence is perceptible in Arendt’s depiction, in the 
preface to Between Past and Future, of the public sphere as a gathering of equals around a table, at 
the head of which an empty place has been left. Quoting the men of the European resistance, she 
writes: “At every meal that we eat together, freedom is invited to sit down. The chair remains 
vacant, but the place is set” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 4). The empty chair is itself an invitation to agency 
that consists precisely in there being “no-one at the head”,8 to which Goebbels adds that such 
“table parties” (which he stages quite literally in the opera Landscape with Distant Relatives) “are 
hence also invitations to the audience to figuratively find their own seat at the table” (Goebbels 
2015, 14). In the presence of this absence or void, which Arendt also figures as a “mirage”, a “fata 
morgana” or “an apparition of freedom” (Arendt [1961] 2006, 4) those gathered must create “that 
public space between themselves where freedom could appear” (4); this can occur to the extent 
that each gazes upon the invisible and describes, in their own terms, how this lost treasure 
appears. 
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1 See, for example, Arendt [1961] 2006, 22–23. Referring to the example of the ancient Greek polis, Arendt writes: 
“The distinction was that the Greeks, living together in a polis, conducted their affairs by means of speech, through 
persuasion (πεέθειν), and not by means of violence, through mute coercion. Hence, when free men obeyed their 
government, or the laws of the polis, their obedience was called πειθαρχία, a word which indicates clearly that 
obedience was obtained by persuasion and not by force.” By contrast: “Barbarians were ruled by violence and 
slaves forced to labor, and since violent action and toil are alike in that they do not need speech to be effective, 
barbarians and slaves were ἄνευ λόγον, that is, they did not live with each other primarily by means of speech.”  
2 Goebbels uses both “musictheatre” and “music-theatre” as terms for describing this and similar works. (See 
Goebbels 2015, 13; also www.heinergoebbels.com.) 
3 Goebbels provides the text of this section of the “Ice Tale” in his Program Notes to Stifters Dinge: “Now we 
recognised the noise that we had heard earlier in the air; it was not in the air, it was close to us now. In the depths 
of the forest it resounded near us and came from the twigs and branches as they splintered and fell to the ground. 
It was all the more dreadful as everything else stood motionless. Not a twig, not a pine needle stirred in the whole 
glittering brightness, until after an ice-fall a branch would come crashing down. Then all was silent again. We 
listened and stared; I don’t know whether it was amazement or fear of driving deeper into that thing” (Goebbels 
2007b). 
4 See Todorov 1990, 69. 
5 Circa 1660. Listed by the alternative title of Marsh on the website of the The State Hermitage Museum, St 
Peterburg (2019), and often also known as A Wooded Marsh. “Swamp” is the name given to the painting in the 
program notes for Stifters Dinge.  
6 Also known as The Hunt in the Forest. c. 1460. Ashmolean Museum, Oxford. “Night Hunt” is the name given to the 
painting in the program notes for Stifters Dinge. 
7 First produced in May 1998 in Munich as part of the Musica Viva Festival and Hanns Eisler’s one hundredth 
birthday commemorations. 
8 See Rancière 2001, ¶2.  
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